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The United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) 
was established by Security Council Resolution 1996 on 8 July 2011, in 
order to support this fledging state in consolidating peace and security; 
establishing conditions for development; governing efficiently and demo-
cratically; and in establishing good neighbourly relations. South Sudan’s 
independence, which was backed by overwhelming popular support 
(nearly 99%) in a referendum held in January 2011, was the result of a six 
year long process, set in motion by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA). This agreement was signed in January 2005 between the Govern-
ment of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) 
and ended a war that had spanned more than two decades. However, 
many issues related to ethnic polarisation, inter-communal tensions and 
extreme violence still remain to be resolved. Indeed, South Sudan’s popu-
lation is currently considered to be at high risk of mass atrocity crimes, 
something that represents great challenges to the UN mission.1  
    As outlined below, the case of UNMISS is unique in terms of how the mis-
sion has dealt with the protection of civilians under immediate threat of 
violence, and serves to shed light on areas where new thinking is required 
in relation to the protection of civilians in the context of UN peace opera-
tions in volatile environments. 
   
UNMISS and developments since the December 2013 
Although having a broader peacebuilding scope, the initial mandate of 
UNMISS also stipulated several means by which the mission was to support 
the South Sudan government in exercising its responsibility for the protection 
of civilians, including monitoring and reporting on human rights violations 
and potential threats against the civilian population; advising and assisting 
the government, military and police in fulfilling its responsibility to protect 
civilians; deterring violence through proactive deployment and patrols in 
high risk areas; and, within its capabilities and in its areas of deployment, 
protecting civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.2 
   This was based on the assumption that the government and authorities 
would be willing partners in enhancing civilian protection and the respect 
for human rights in the new state. However, this assumption proved to 
be too optimistic. As events have unfolded, not only non-state actors but 
also state authorities, seeking to marginalise ethnic groups and maintain 
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power for an exclusionary elite, have perpetrated violence against civil-
ians, with the government failing badly in its protection responsibilities.3  
   The violent crisis in December 2013 resulted in UNMISS taking steps 
unprecedented in the history of civilian protection. The crisis was the 
culmination of increasing tensions within the ruling party, the SPLM. On 
the first day of the party’s National Liberation Council, on 14 December, 
disagreement between President Salva Kiir, the former Vice-President, 
Riek Machar, and other senior party leaders came to a head, resulting in 
Machar and others not returning the following day, when important deci-
sions were to be made. On the evening of 15 December, fighting broke 
out in the barracks of the Presidential Guard in Juba, and the President 
declared that this constituted an attempted coup d’état by forces loyal 
to Machar. The fighting spread quickly to other military installations as 
well as residential areas, and resulted in large-scale killings and abuses. 
Thousands of civilians and individuals deserting from the security forces 
fled and sought refuge within UNMISS bases. The tensions continued to 
rise, with segments of the forces taking sides with or against the presi-
dent, and spread to the states of Upper Nile, Unity, Central Equatoria and 
Jonglei, resulting in even more civilian casualties and refugees. Due to 
the ethnic dimension of the conflict, many of the refugees escaped tar-
geted attacks against particular communities. Machar announced that he 
intended to remove the president from office and that his forces – subse-
quently labelled SPLM/A-IO – constituted a resistance group.4  
    The crisis also lead to a deterioration of the relationship between UNMISS 
and the South Sudanese government. The UN was accused of taking sides 
in the conflict and senior government officials made hostile public remarks 
about the mission. There were several anti-UN demonstrations, UN person-
nel were harassed, threatened and had their movements obstructed. There 
were also serious status-of-forces agreement violations including several 
attempts by SPLA soldiers to forcibly enter the UN compound in Bor. 
   The backdrop for this was the decision by the UN mission, faced with the 
threat of large-scale civilian killings, to open the gates of its compounds 
in Juba, Bor, Akobó, Bentiu, Malakal and Melut to the fleeing masses. 
The military engineers and humanitarian partners moved swiftly to 
ensure a minimum of facilities within the compounds. By March 2014, 
85,000 persons had sought refuge at eight UNMISS compounds, and by 
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the time of writing the number has grown to more than 166,000.5 Need-
less to say, this has placed a huge strain on the resources of the mission 
and has meant a shift in focus as well as a reallocation of resources. The 
immediate need for additional forces to protect civilians and assist in 
the provision of humanitarian assistance was secured through inter-
mission cooperation mandated by Security Council Resolution 2132 of 
24 December, raising the troop level of UNMISS to 12,500 personnel and 
the police component to 1,323 personnel.6 The mandate of UNMISS was 
formally reprioritised towards the protection of civilians, human rights 
monitoring, creating conditions for the delivery of humanitarian assist-
ance, and supporting the implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities 
Agreement (signed in January that year) in Security Council Resolution 
2155 of 27 May 2014. Among these responsibilities, the protection of 
civilians was to have first priority. The resolution also decided that the 
increased size of the troop and police components be maintained and 
authorized the mission to ‘use all necessary means’ to perform its tasks. 
Thus, UNMISS was given one of the strongest Security Council mandates 
to protect civilians under threat of physical violence.7  
   Since this, no less than seven additional peace agreements have been 
signed between the government and the rebel forces, but the violence has 
continued. The intensity of the fighting has varied, with periodic spikes, 
notably in April 2014, October 2014 and April 2015. Towns and villages 
have been burned, sometimes with people being burned alive, and torture, 
extrajudicial killings, child recruitment and incredibly brutal sexual and 
gender-based violence is widespread. While the capital Juba was affected at 
the beginning of the 2013 crisis, most of the fighting has taken place in the 
North-East of the country, in the Greater Upper Nile region – in particular in 
Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei states. It is estimated that around 1.6 million 
have been displaced and tens of thousands have been killed since Decem-
ber 2013. Both government and rebel forces perpetrate atrocities, which in 
many cases may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. The 
fighting has also meant that food production has been impossible in the 
areas affected over the last few years, and that 70% of the areas’ schools 
have closed. This adds other devastating dimensions to the crisis.8 
   As a result of the significant upsurge in violence this spring, the UN 
Security Council extended UNMISS’ mandate until the end of November, 
maintaining the size of the military and police components. It under-
scored grave alarm concerning the worsening political, security and 
humanitarian crisis in South Sudan and expressed grave concern about 
reports that there are reasonable grounds to believe that war crimes and 
crimes against humanity are being committed. It reminded the govern-
ment of its primary responsibility to protect civilians.9  
 
Protection of Civilian sites
The case of UNMISS represent an unprecedented case in terms of offering 
protection of civilians in such large numbers within its compounds. The 
civilians are sheltered in so-called Protection of Civilian sites (PoC sites). 
Conceptually PoC sites should not be confused with the ‘safe havens’ of the 
1990s, which were larger scale, pre-planned areas designated (but failing) 
to offer civilians protection, nor with camps for internally displaced people 
(IDP camps), which provide more substantial humanitarian assistance. The 
PoC sites are meant to be a temporary last resort and to provide refuge for 
civilians under immediate threat of physical violence. This was emphasised 
in UNMISS’ original guidelines for protecting civilians at their bases. How-
ever, in the aftermath of the December 2013 crisis, these conceptual lines 
have become blurred. Large numbers of refugees have settled in the PoC 
sites with uncertain prospects for departure, with the the sites also attract-
ing IDPs from other parts of the country. As a result the UN mission has had 
to adopt a pragmatic view on what its role within these sites should be. 
   Humanitarian assistance was not part of UNMISS’s original mandate in 
South Sudan.  Before the December 2013 crisis, the humanitarian needs of 
the South Sudanese population were the focus of the various humanitarian 
actors present in the country. As the numbers within the UN gates grew, 
the need for humanitarian assistance there became increasingly acute. The 
humanitarian actors, always guarding their image of independence and 
neutrality, were initially weary of getting involved within the PoC sites as 
this would mean closer association with the military forces. However, as 
the humanitarian needs there grew, several actors, such as Médecins Sans 
Frontières (MSF) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 
felt compelled to get involved inside the UN gates due to the humanitarian 
imperative. As a result, a camp management cluster was established and 
responsibilities were divided between the UN mission and the humanitar-
ian actors. Naturally, the humanitarian actors were to coordinate the provi-
sion of humanitarian assistance whereas UNMISS was to be responsible for 
security vis á vis external threats and within the camps, as well as for pro-
viding logistical support to the humanitarian actors. Nevertheless, when 
the security situation within the sites has made it too dangerous for the 
humanitarian actors to operate, UNMISS has had to take on humanitarian 
responsibilities, such as food and water provision, site management and 
the building of latrines. The mission’s health clinics have also provided 
medical care to a substantial number of civilians.10  
   The living conditions within the PoC sites are very poor. With so many 
people seeking shelter, the sites are extremely crowded, and this makes it 
difficult to ensure that the sites adhere to humanitarian standards. In some 
instances there have been up to ten times as many people per square metre 
as the so-called Sphere standard prescribes.11 Needless to say, the conges-
tion, and the fact that the sites are extremely muddy, represents big sanita-
tion challenges and major health and mortality risks.
   The security situation is also challenging. The congestion is itself a source 
of tension, and in addition there is intra-community leadership struggles, 
inter-communal tensions, youth gang violence and domestic violence. 
Humanitarian personnel and UNMISS staff are also being threatened. 
Sexual and gender-based violence against women and children is a worry-
ing problem, as well as the sexual exploitation of women and children by 
male site inhabitants. The situation within the camp reflects developments 
on the outside and violence there frequently spill-over into the PoC sites, 
leading to casualties. A recent incident took place in the site in Juba on 
11 May 2015. With the further ethnicization of the conflict, more problems 
are predictable as long as the fighting continues. The sites have also been 
attacked from the outside by the warring parties, resulting in the death of 
civilians on several occasions. The perhaps gravest of these was the attack 
on the PoC site in Bor in April 2014, which left over 50 people dead.12  
   UNMISS has addressed the security concerns in a variety of ways. The 
mission has reached out to community leaders and sought to establish 
some ground rules for appropriate conduct within the PoC sites. It has 
also supported informal community-led conflict resolution mechanisms, 
and implemented conflict transformation trainings and peace dialogues at 
some of the sites. UNMISS police patrol the sites on a daily basis and deals 
with incidents occurring. This includes investigation and co-operation 
with local authorities in order to bring the perpetrators to justice. The latter 
have entailed some human rights and legal dilemmas for UNMISS, but are 
important in order to prevent impunity. The mission has also had to expel 
individuals from the sites (after conducting a risk assessment regarding 
their individual security outside the gates) in order to maintain security. 
10 Damian Lilly (2014) ‘Protection of Civilians sites: a new type of displacement settlement?’ 
Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, 62 (September).
11 As set out in the internationally recognised The Sphere Handbook: Humanitarian Charter 
and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response, see electronic version at http://www.
spherehandbook.org. 
12 Human Rights Watch (2014) South Sudan’s New War: Abuses by Government and Opposition 
Forces, 7 August, https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/08/07/south-sudans-new-war/abuses-
government-and-opposition-forces; United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, 
Flash Human Rights Report on the Escalation of Fighting in Greater Upper Nile, April/May 
2015, 20 June 2015; S/2015/296, Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan, 29 April 
2015; Damian Lilly (2014) ‘Protection of Civilians sites: a new type of displacement settle-
ment?’ Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, 62 (September).
5 Remarks to the press made by Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emer-
gency Relief Coodinator, Stephen O’Brien, Juba, South Sudan, 25 July 2015.
6 S/RES/2132(2013), 24 December.
7 S/RES/2155 (2014), 27 May.
8 United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, Flash Human Rights Report on the 
Escalation of Fighting in Greater Upper Nile, April/May 2015, 20 June 2015; Global Centre 
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9 S/RES/2223 (2015), 28 May.
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Moreover, since many of the people seeking shelter are former combat-
ants, UNMISS has implemented a strict disarmament policy at arrival. With 
regard to domestic violence and sexual and gender-based violence, the mis-
sion co-operates with humanitarian partners in order to streamline referral 
pathways and provide emergency services efficiently to the victims.13 
Protection of Civilians outside the PoC sites
The UNMISS Protection of Civilians Strategy outlines protection activities 
along three tiers: 
1) Protection through political process
2) Providing protection from physical violence
3) Establishing a protective environment14 
Although the protection of civilians mandate of UNMISS gives priority to 
protection from physical violence, there is no sequential order among these 
tiers. Activities within the tiers are to take place concurrently, and together 
they are intended to constitute a comprehensive approach to preventing and 
responding to threats and attacks on South Sudan’s civilian population. 
Moreover, although the PoC sites absorb much of the resources of the mis-
sion, the protection needs of civilians in major population centres and rural 
areas are to be addressed simultaneously.15   
   Activities within tier 1 include supporting the implementation of the Ces-
sation of Hostilities Agreement, which is seen as central to ending the atroci-
ties committed against the civilian population. In addition, the tier includes 
advocacy in connection to political agreements to ensure that protection 
concerns, including sexual and gender-based violence are addressed within 
them. Inter-communal dialogue, dialogue between the government and 
opposition forces, conflict mitigation and conflict resolution activities also 
fall under this tier. UNMISS’ civil affairs team organises meetings with local 
authorities, community leaders, youth and women across South Sudan, 
including in territory held by the opposition. The purpose of these meet-
ings is to identify conflict threats and mitigation measures. The mission also 
organises a number of roundtable discussions and workshops with youth, 
community leaders and internally displaced people in order to develop con-
flict management skills and to engage in resolving inter communal disputes. 
UNMISS seek to de-escalate tensions by engaging with security officials, 
state and community leaders, and promote peaceful coexistence between 
Nuer and Dinka communities through regular engagement.16 
   In addition to the protection from physical violence offered by, and 
within, the PoC sites,17 the tier 2 activities of UNMISS also include proac-
tive deployment, high visibility patrolling of areas deemed to be vulnerable 
and at risk, and focused aviation patrols. The purpose of the activities is 
partly to deter attacks on civilians, partly to interact with and reassure vul-
nerable communities in order to avoid further displacements, and partly 
to gather information and assess threats. If needed, UNMISS can also use 
force, up to lethal force, to protect civilians from physical violence.18  
   This work has been hampered by the restriction of UNMISS’ movements 
imposed by the South Sudan government. Moreover, both government 
and opposition forces have attacked UN personnel, UN helicopters have 
been shot down, UN convoys have been attacked, UN personnel have 
been detained and kidnapped, and there have been several attacks on 
UN camps. In addition, UNMISS has still not reached its authorised force 
strength and lacks mobility assets such as helicopters and riverine assets 
for patrolling the Nile. In his recent report on South Sudan, Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon, appeals to troop-contributing countries to ‘expedi-
tiously deploy remaining surge capabilities and military equipment, which 
are critical to enable UNMISS to deliver its mandated tasks effectively’.19 
These deficiencies serve to exacerbate even further the substantial logis-
tical challenges presented by the terrain, lack of infrastructure and the 
climate (in particular the rainy season), which would make many areas 
hard to access even if UNMISS was operating at its full, planned capacity. 
   Activities within tier 3 focus on supporting the creation of conditions in 
which it would be safe for displaced people (within and outside the PoC 
camps) to return home or settle permanently in new locations. Advocacy 
for, and monitoring of, the adherence to international human rights, the 
rule of law and the appropriate conduct of the police and law institutions 
is part of this work. So too is work aimed at building trust and confidence 
amongst displaced people and resident communities. In a pilot project 
focusing on selected areas in Juba, UNMISS, in cooperation with the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), provides technical sup-
port to the confidence- and trust-building policing strategy of the Inspector 
General of Police. Moreover, with the aim of creating safer conditions with 
regard to sexual and gender-based violence, the UN has inter alia worked to 
establish networks of male advocates in all the ten states of South Sudan.20
   Although Security Council Resolution 2187 of 25 November 2014 underlined 
‘the necessity to find sustainable solutions for the internally displaced popula-
tion, including in alternative safe and secure locations’,21 and the Special Rep-
resentative of the Secretary-General, Ellen Magrethe Løj, stated at a subsequent 
press conference that ‘we need to focus more on fostering a safe and secure 
environment outside the UN camps’,22 mass return of the internally displaced 
people seems unlikely in the current situation. Indeed, with the increased ten-
sion and violence seen since April 2015, the PoC sites have recently received 
thousands of new arrivals. For example, the PoC site in Bentiu registered and 
verified over 28,000 additional arrivals between 29 April and 15 June 2015.23 
This underlines the need to work on all three tiers concurrently. 
   Notwithstanding this, the need for civilian protection outside the PoC 
sites is acute. The number of displaced people there is at least ten times 
as high as within the sites. Many of these try to reach the UN sites, but are 
stopped by checkpoints set up by the warring parties in order to hinder the 
movement of enemy forces as well as to prevent civilians from getting to the 
bases. In addition, the civilians are subjected to various forms of violence, 
torture and killing at these checkpoints. The situation is also precarious for 
a large number of displaced people in the Greater Upper Nile, who in an 
attempt to escape the fighting, now are sheltering in the swamps.24 And, 
of course, the threats of physical and sexual violence, torture, arrests, 
enforced disappearance, burning etc. are not limited to the displaced part 
of the population. As the warring parties move into new territory, new 
groups of civilians become threatened and subjected to this.
   In a recent statement, the UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Geno-
cide, Adama Dieng, said ‘The brutality and cruelty of these attacks defies 
imagination … Given the widespread and systematic nature of attacks 
against civilians, some may constitute war crimes and crimes against 
humanity and those responsible must be held accountable.’ He placed the 
responsibility for the suffering and despair of the South Sudanese people on 
both parties to the conflict due to their unwillingness to end the civil war.25
Lessons learnt and questions highlighted by the UNMISS case
The South Sudan case has in several ways highlighted the need for new 
thinking around the protection of civilians in the context of UN peace 
operations in volatile environments.
PoC sites
There is widespread agreement that the decision to open the gates of UNMISS’ 
compounds to civilians that were under immediate threat of physical violence, 
was correct. There is no doubt that this saved thousands of lives. Violence of 
20 S/2015/296, Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan, 29 April 2015.
21 S/RES/2187(2014) 25 November. 
22 Press conference in Juba 11 December 2014.
23 United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, Flash Human Rights Report on the 
Escalation of Fighting in Greater Upper Nile, April/May 2015, 20 June 2015.
24 United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, Flash Human Rights Report on the 
Escalation of Fighting in Greater Upper Nile, April/May 2015, 20 June 2015; S/2015/296, 
Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan, 29 April 2015.
25 See, ‘Impunity must urgently be tackled in South Sudan – USG Adama Dieng’, http://unmiss.unmis-
sions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3465&ctl=Details&mid=6047&ItemID=9074499&language=en-US.
13 S/2015/296, Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan, 29 April 2015; Damian Lilly 
(2014) ‘Protection of Civilians sites: a new type of displacement settlement?’ Humanitarian 
Exchange Magazine, 62 (September).
 14 UNMISS Protection of Civilians Strategy, 15 September 2014, para 31.
 15 UNMISS Protection of Civilians Strategy, 15 September 2014.
 16  S/2015/296, Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan, 29 April 2015; UNMISS Pro-
tection of Civilians Strategy, 15 September 2014.
17  Currently there are six of them, see, S/2015/296, Report of the Secretary-General on South-
Sudan, 29 April 2015, para 30.
18  S/2015/296, Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan, 29 April 2015; UNMISS Pro-
tection of Civilians Strategy, 15 September 2014.
19 S/2015/296, Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan, 29 April 2015, para 67.
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this scale was not anticipated and UNMISS did not have the mandate nor the means 
to stop the killings when the fighting broke out. But the mission did not hesitate to 
do what it had the ability to do, and thus it avoided the fate of UN missions of the 
past, which were passive bystanders while atrocities were committed. However, its 
approach was ad hoc, and as such this case has highlighted the need to develop 
guidelines for situations in which large numbers of civilians need immediate shelter 
and may end up staying for a substantial period of time. Thought is required around 
the questions of how (or whether) future UN missions should be prepared for a rapid 
influx of large numbers of refugees, and how they may accommodate such numbers 
and expeditiously provide a minimum of water, food and sanitation. 
   There is also a need to think about how to coherently and consistently provide 
security within the PoC sites and for site inhabitants who venture outside to fetch 
various supplies, as well as securing the PoC sites against external attack. There is 
also the question of how to police the PoC sites. Since the PoC sites were on UNMISS 
premises, UN police had to take on an executive role there, and had to cooperate 
with South Sudan authorities in order to bring perpetrators to justice. This is chal-
lenging in scenarios where the same authorities may be involved in gross human 
rights violations, and should not be done in an ad hoc manner in future. 
Cooperation with humanitarian actors
The unprecedented situation with so many people sheltering within the UN mis-
sion’s gates, demanded that UNMISS personnel and humanitarian actors acted 
with pragmatism and creativity in order to take care of the tasks at hand. The 
humanitarian actors’ reluctance to work too closely with military personnel, as 
well as the different nature of their respective responsibilities, meant that there had 
to be parallel coordination mechanisms for humanitarian assistance and protec-
tion activities.26  The cooperation and coordination between these mechanisms was 
secured through the camp management cluster, daily coordination meetings, and 
a humanitarian coordinator, who acted like a ‘firewall’ so that there were no direct 
interaction between humanitarian and military actors.  UNMISS and its humanitar-
ian partners were in this way brokering new ground, which could serve as a model 
(or at least, a starting point) for future missions facing similar challenges. 
  The widespread occurrence of sexual and gender-based violence both inside 
and outside the PoC sites has also underlined the need to find modes for coop-
eration between humanitarian actors and UNMISS. The streamlining of referral 
pathways for victims in order to secure treatment and other emergency responses 
is one example of lessons that can be learnt from this case. However, in order to 
tackle this problem, much thinking remains to be done in terms of its prevention, 
protection, appropriate reaction and how to combat impunity for perpetrators 
of sexual and gender-based violence.27 These issues are too wide-reaching to be 
dealt with adequately here and is a topic for a separate study. 
Prioritisation of protection activities
The case of South Sudan highlights the need to work concurrently on the 
three tiers of protection of civilians – protection through political process; 
providing protection from physical violence; and establishing a protective 
environment. Without an inclusive and comprehensive political process 
aimed at establishing conditions for a sustainable peace, the need for 
physical protection may be infinite. And if work is not done to ensure the 
safe return or permanent resettlement of the IDPs, people will be stuck in 
the PoC camps or other hiding places indefinitely. However, the experi-
ence of UNMISS shows that this three-tired approach requires much more 
resources that the mission has had at its disposal. Scarce resources has 
meant that UNMISS has had to prioritise the provision of protection from 
physical violence, and that to only a small proportion of the South Suda-
nese civilians that have needed it. The logistical problems (which should 
have been foreseen due to the UN’s previous engagement in the area) aside, 
it is clear that UNMISS has lacked the resources and ability to act on its 
mandate in a consistent and robust manner, something that is critical to 
the protection of civilians.28 This lesson must be taken into account in 
future planning of missions with similar protection of civilians mandates. 
Another, and hitherto unanswered, question arising from the UNMISS case 
regards the ability to carry out the other parts of the protection mandate if 
the mission were to open fire against any of the warring parties in order to 
protect civilians. This is probably not a question that can be answered in 
general terms, but depends upon the specific circumstances of each mis-
sion. It is nevertheless, a question worth pondering further.  
   A final lesson from the UNMISS case, is something that became clear 
as soon as the crisis of December 2013 erupted. That is, that there was 
an inherent contradiction between the initial peacebuilding mandate of 
UNMISS and its protection of civilians role. The peacebuilding activities 
were supposed to support the government, whereas the protection activi-
ties became necessary because of the government’s neglect of its primary 
responsibility to protect its population. With government forces also 
committing atrocities, such support became totally irreconcilable with a 
protection of civilians mandate. This illustrates the limitations of what UN 
peacekeeping missions can achieve in volatile environments, and begs 
the question of whether the UN is such circumstances should concentrate 
solely on protecting vulnerable civilians.29 
  
26 Damian Lilly (2014) ‘Protection of Civilians sites: a new type of displacement settlement?’, Humanitarian 
Exchange Magazine, 62 (September).
27 This issue is touched upon in A/70/95–S/2015/446, Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace 
Operations on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people, 17 June 2015, para 99. 
28 This is not a problem limited to UNMISS, but concerns many missions with a protection of 
civilians mandate, see A/70/95–S/2015/446, Report of the High-level Independent Panel 
on Peace Operations on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people, 17 
June 2015, para 95.
 29 Cedric de Coning and Diana Felix Da Costa (forthcoming) ‘United Nations Mission in the Re-
public of South Sudan (UNMISS)’ in Joachim A. Koops et. al. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of 
U.N. Peacekeeping Operations (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
